

of an emergency, approximately 1,700 ships would be required from the operating merchant marine to carry the initial lift of men and supplies. We have only 1,200 in operation or approximately 500 less than the defense requirement. The 1,200 ships in full operation are very important to us. As they become old and need replacement, they keep our shipyards in operation and maintain the nucleus of shipbuilding skills so necessary in each emergency. As they operate, they keep alive and in efficient operation the organizations to supply, to repair, and to direct them as they move in and out of the ports around the globe. In an emergency, their officers and crews divide to man the 2,000 ships in the laid-up fleet, to give a few men with experience to each ship, and to train the inexperienced, seagoing personnel which is added to operate the wartime merchant marine. As new ships are built during an emergency, they divide again to man the new ships and train the ever-increasing, inexperienced personnel. Basic to the whole ability to mobilize and expand is the merchant marine in operation at the time that the emergency occurs, and basic to that operation is the amount of cargo available to American flag ships before the emergency occurs. Foreign purchasers and foreign nations direct the cargoes which they control into ships of their own choosing, and rarely, if ever, into American flag ships. If we are to have a share in the cargoes which we control in these programs of foreign aid, we must do likewise with the cargoes which we control. Until, if ever, the 1,700 ships which will be required by our Defense Establishment at the beginning of some future emergency can maintain themselves without assistance, some system of providing cargoes for the ships that do operate will remain essential.

We speak quite often as if the sales and transfers of grain to foreign nations or purchasers which come about through aid which our Government grants were of special concern to the Department of Agriculture, the Commodity Credit Corporation or the farmers of America. It is more accurate to realize that the American farmer does not own the grain which is being transferred and that he has already been paid for it on a parity basis when he sold the grain to the Government. The Government and all of the taxpayers who support it have an equal interest in the grain and in the programs by which disposal of it is made. It is equally true that the Government and all of the taxpayers who support it own the laid-up fleets from which the merchant marine draws to expand, sometimes in peace and always during war. If, however, we pursue the thought that seems to prevail that the farmers have a greater interest in the farm program and the disposal of farm commodities to foreign nations, and that the merchant marine industry has a greater interest in the Maritime Administration and the ships which it controls, there is still some basis for the interest of the Merchant Marine Committee in the legislation from other committees which involves the transportation of cargoes and of the

Committee on Agriculture in the facilities over which the Merchant Marine Committee has some jurisdiction. It is by no means a one-way street in which the merchant marine is loading itself upon some other activity.

Consider, for example, the storage of grain in the vessels of the laid-up fleet. Currently 338 of such vessels are loaded with grain and an additional 106 vessels are scheduled to be loaded, a total of 444 vessels. These represent a capital investment of \$767 million. The postwar sales price for these ships under the Ship Sales Act would be approximately \$242 million. A substantial capital asset which is of peculiar concern to the merchant marine industry is immobilized for the purposes of the industry and made available to the agricultural interest without charge.

Each vessel stores an average of 228,000 bushels, or an average of 6,100 tons. The annual storage value per vessel at 15 cents per bushel is \$34,200. The current annual storage value contributed by the 444 vessels is \$15.2 million. This amount annually is the contribution without reimbursement of the merchant marine side of the Government to the Commodity Credit Corporation and the agricultural interest of the Government.

Good sense says that we should use the unneeded ships of the laid-up fleet for the storage of the grain which is not moving. The ships are available and they belong to the Government as does the grain. Good sense says with equal force that we should use the grain when it moves to keep our operating ships in operation. We need the defense potential as much as we need the other arms of defense.

Actually, it does not cost much to use American ships rather than foreign-flag ships, not nearly as much as the saving of storage charges contributes to the agricultural interests. Cargoes which move in our regularly scheduled ships take the same rates as they do in the regularly scheduled foreign ships. Bulk cargoes carried by tramp ships move in our ships at about 15 percent more than foreign ships charge. The income taxes generated by the use of the American ships reimburse the Government by more than the amount of the excess. These taxes may not be reflected in the appropriations to or the computations of the Department of Agriculture, but they do show up in the Treasury of the United States to the benefit of the taxpayers who own the grain and who also own the ships.

A JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

(Mr. Hiestand asked and was given permission to address the House for 5 minutes.)

Mr. Hiestand. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing a bill which would set up a permanent congressional "watchdog" system as recommended by the Hoover Commission, to check the operation and expenditures of our foreign intelligence and especially the Central Intelligence Agency. It is important that Congress consider this matter immediately, for

the present situation existing in our Central Intelligence Agency, the Commission's task force reports, is unsatisfactory. The Congress is responsible.

Certainly in this age of undeclared war when our very survival might depend on adequate advance warning of enemy movements, both real and contemplated, we can appreciate the importance of reliable intelligence. We must recognize the responsibility of Congress to make certain that the citizens of this country can depend upon its principal intelligence agency. The story of American foreign intelligence has not been outstanding, and Congress has recognized that if America does not have the will and ingenuity to secure needed information, then it leaves itself wide open to a surprise attack such as that on Pearl Harbor. With the knowledge that information necessary to anticipate that attack actually was available to the Government, but that there was no system in existence to assure that the information, properly evaluated, would be brought to the attention of the proper authorities, Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency by the National Security Act of 1947.

The Central Intelligence Agency recently received its first thorough evaluation by an able Hoover Commission Task Force, presided over by Gen. Mark W. Clark.

Although the task force report was reassuring in that it did not find reason for alarm about the loyalty of employees in intelligence work, many of its findings are quite disturbing. Some of these particularly bothered me, and led me to the conclusion that a congressional watchdog committee is important to carry out our responsibility as elected representatives.

The task force says:

Effective intelligence has become increasingly necessary for our protection against the propaganda, infiltration, and aggressiveness of the Communist leaders. By trial and error, study, and skill, we have made progress; but we must not labor under any complacent delusions. There is still much to be done by our intelligence community to bring its achievements up to an acceptable level.

Now I do not know whether this shocks you as it does me. To me this means one thing: Our intelligence activities are simply unacceptable. Subversives have penetrated into important areas of our society, and the task force says that our security measures have permitted the collection of vital secrets in this country with relative ease. Yet, the task force continues:

The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially available. Success in this field —

Says the task force —

depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological capabilities.

The report indicates that diplomatic timidity and protocol prohibitions have seriously interfered with intelligence operations. The task force says:

It must be realized that diplomacy is not an end in itself —

H.R. 7533

Booth, of Anchorage, Alaska, and for other purposes;

H. R. 897. An act to provide preference right to certain land in Alaska to Robert Henry Soyok, of Kenai, Alaska, and for other purposes;

H. R. 902. An act to provide preference right to certain land in Alaska to Patrick Harold Johnson, of Anchor Point, Alaska, and for other purposes;

H. R. 904. An act to provide preference right to certain land in Alaska to Bert Arthur Faraday, of Anchor Point, Alaska, and for other purposes;

H. R. 905. An act to provide preference right to certain land in Alaska to Carl E. Robinson, of Anchor Point, Alaska, and for other purposes;

H. R. 962. An act for the relief of Maria Louise Andreis;

H. R. 1044. An act for the relief of Teresa Alice Townsend;

H. R. 1155. An act for the relief of Solomon Wiesel;

H. R. 1245. An act for the relief of Marianne Anita Zelinka;

H. R. 1275. An act for the relief of Gennaro Savarese;

H. R. 1333. An act for the relief of Ebolya Wolf;

H. R. 1463. An act for the relief of Rudolfo M. Gomez (Capaz);

H. R. 1538. An act for the relief of Jean Isabel Hay Watts;

H. R. 1540. An act for the relief of Mrs. Joan Craig Newell;

H. R. 1541. An act for the relief of Mrs. Maria Dieran Simon;

H. R. 1549. An act for the relief of Salvacion Carbon;

H. R. 1551. An act for the relief of Gualberto Estralla Alabastro, Pura Zarco Alabastro, and Arlene Alabastro;

H. R. 1648. An act for the relief of Sister Luigia Pellegrino, Sister Angelina Nicastro, and Sister Luigina Di Martino;

H. R. 1661. An act for the relief of Kim Dong Su;

H. R. 1693. An act for the relief of Barbara Knape;

H. R. 1750. An act for the relief of Elena Gigliotti;

H. R. 1801. An act to authorize the purchase, sale, and exchange of certain Indian lands on the Yakima Indian Reservation, and for other purposes;

H. R. 1802. An act to authorize the leasing of certain lands of the Yakima Tribe to the State of Washington for historical and for park purposes;

H. R. 1868. An act for the relief of Ernest Tomassich and Yoko Matsuo Tomassich;

H. R. 1883. An act for the relief of Margaret Gartner;

H. R. 1929. An act for the relief of Eufemia Benich;

H. R. 1954. An act for the relief of Ingrid Samson;

H. R. 2073. An act for the relief of Bengt Wikstam;

H. R. 2274. An act for the relief of Alejandro Florentino Munoz;

H. R. 2353. An act for the relief of John Odabashian, doctor of medicine;

H. R. 2406. An act to amend subsection (e) of section 1 of title 5 of the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937, as amended;

H. R. 2495. An act for the relief of Antoni Rajkowski;

H. R. 2731. An act for the relief of Mihal Indig;

H. R. 2724. An act for the relief of Miss Elvira Bortolin;

H. R. 2756. An act for the relief of Frank Scriver;

H. R. 2911. An act for the relief of Max Steinsapir;

H. R. 2925. An act for the relief of Carmelo Rodriguez Perez, also known as Carmelo Rodriguez Fenald;

H. R. 2929. An act for the relief of Lazara Camargo Bernoudy;

H. R. 3071. An act for the relief of Eleanor Ramos;

H. R. 3123. An act to modify the acts of August 12, 1935 (40 Stat. 571, 584), May 15, 1936 (49 Stat. 1274), July 1, 1946 (60 Stat. 357), August 8, 1946 (60 Stat. 923), and June 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 211), with respect to the recoupment of certain public school construction costs, and to amend the act of August 17, 1950 (64 Stat. 456), relating to the expenditure of funds for cooperating with the public school board of Walker, Minn.;

H. R. 3193. An act for the relief of Evelyn Hardy Waters;

H. R. 3253. An act to amend section 6 of Public Law 874, 81st Congress, so as to provide for the continued operation of certain schools on military installations;

H. R. 3560. An act to provide for the relief of certain members of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and for other purposes;

H. R. 3853. An act for the relief of Guadalupe Zuniga (also known as Benita Chaparral-Venegas or Guadalupe Acceta);

H. R. 3972. An act for the relief of Anthonius Marinus Kronenburg;

H. R. 4225. An act authorizing the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to convey certain property of the United States to the city of North Little Rock, Ark.;

H. R. 4245. An act for the relief of Mrs. Esther Rodriguez de Uribe;

H. R. 4367. An act to provide for the distribution of funds belonging to the members of the Creek Nation of Indians, and for other purposes;

H. R. 4753. An act to amend subsection (e) (1) of section 13A of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 to change from 2 years to 3 years the standard contained therein with respect to the past affiliations of individuals conducting the management of certain organizations;

H. R. 4894. An act to repeal certain laws relating to timber and stone on the public domain;

H. R. 4904. An act to extend the Renegotiation Act of 1951 for 2 years;

H. R. 5046. An act making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and related agencies, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, and for other purposes;

H. R. 5539. An act to extend for a period of 2 years the privilege of free importation of gifts from members of the Armed Forces of the United States on duty abroad;

H. R. 6059. An act relating to revisions of the executive agreement concerning trade and related matters entered into by the President of the United States and the President of the Philippines on July 4, 1946;

H. R. 6086. An act for the relief of certain relatives of United States citizens or lawfully resident aliens;

H. R. 6331. An act authorizing the Territory of Hawaii, through its duly designated officers and boards, to negotiate a compromise agreement, exchange with, sell or lease to the owners of certain shorelands, certain tidelands, both in the Territory of Hawaii, and to make covenants with such owners, in settlement of certain damage claims and for a conveyance of littoral rights;

H. R. 6796. An act to provide for the conveyance to the city of Clarksburg, W. Va., of certain property which was donated for use in connection with a veterans' hospital, and which is not being so used; and

H. J. Res. 256. Joint resolution providing for an objective, thorough, and nationwide analysis and reevaluation of the human and economic problems of mental illness, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER announced his signature to enrolled bills of the Senate of the following titles:

S. 350. An act for the relief of Siegfried Rosenzweig;

S. 614. An act to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, to authorize the Administrator of General Services to donate certain property to the American National Red Cross; and

S. 824. An act to authorize and direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain lands erroneously conveyed to the United States.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. O'BRIEN of New York. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 3 o'clock and 38 minutes p. m.) the House, pursuant to its previous order, adjourned until Monday, July 25, 1955, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1012. A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled "A bill for the relief of Mary Viola Jones"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1013. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice, transmitting copies of orders granting the applications for permanent residence filed by the subjects, pursuant to section 4 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. McMILLAN: Committee on the District of Columbia. S. 1289. An act to establish a Domestic Relations Branch in the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; with amendment (Rept. No. 1302). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HOLMES: Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 4579. A bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to repeal the duty on crude silica; with amendment (Rept. No. 1303). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. KARSTEN: Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 6299. A bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 as it relates to unmanufactured mica and mica films and splittings; with amendment (Rept. No. 1304). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. IANE: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 1077. An act to provide for settlement of claims for damages resulting from the disaster which occurred at Texas City, Tex., on April 16 and 17, 1947; with amendment (Rept. No. 1305). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. JENKINS: Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 6886. A bill to amend the act of October 19, 1949, entitled "An act to assist States in collecting sales and use taxes on cigarettes"; without amendment (Rept. No. 1306). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. SADLAK: Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 6999. A bill to amend sec-

Tufted Textile Manufacturers Association represents 80 percent of the production of tufted carpets and rugs, schedule 9, paragraph 921; 90 percent of the production of tufted bedspreads, schedule 9, paragraph 911 (a); and 98 percent of the production of tufted robes, schedule 9, paragraph 919, in the United States.

Tufted textiles originated in the north Georgia area. Tufted textile products have been made by machine for about 20 years. There now are approximately 250 factories, large and small, some integrated in part. There are factories established now in 18 States of the Union and in 11 foreign countries, to our knowledge. Hundreds of requests are coming in from foreign countries for more and more information on tufting machines for making tufted products in foreign countries.

Modern ideas and ingenuity of the north Georgia machinists developed these tufting machines, which have a marked advantage over weaving. The machines are only partly patented (or only certain parts of the tufted machines are patented), and there is no protection of these patents in foreign markets. Some foreign countries are building these machines today.

The last year's complete statistics on the tufted textile industry as reported by the Bureau of the Census revealed the industry used 135,060,000 pounds of cotton yarns and gray goods in 1952, and other types of fiber in the amount of 4,734,000 pounds. Accurate figures for the first half of 1953, quoted by the Bureau of the Census, plus preliminary figures given by the Bureau of the Census for the last half of 1953, reveal the industry used approximately 152,942,000 pounds of cotton yarns and gray goods last year. This is 319,963 (478-pound net weight) bales of cotton. To produce the lint, estimated by the National Cotton Council of America at 275 pounds per acre, 556,153 acres were required.

There has been a large increase in the use of synthetic fibers and jute backing for carpets and rugs in this industry; however, we do not have these figures at this time. The Bureau of the Census is now securing these statistics for the period July 1, 1953, through June 30, 1954, and has been authorized to secure the figures for the last 6 months of 1954, which figures are not available at this time.

Tufting machines are capable of tufting certain types of bedspreads at the ratio of 10 to 1 over weaving, or tufting lineal yardage 40 to 54 inches wide for robes at a ratio of 25 yards to 1 over weaving, and tufted carpeting 12 to 15 feet wide at a ratio of from 10 to 15 to 1 over weaving, depending on grade of product.

There are 25,000 production employees working in the tufting factories and tufted finishing plants in the United States. It takes approximately 25,000 more production employees to supply the industry with yarn, gray goods, machinery, chemicals, and other vital materials necessary for manufacturing tufted products.

The average hourly wage earnings in the textile industry is \$1.30. In the carpet and rug industry, Government figures for average hourly earnings are \$1.73. We compare these wage earnings in the United States to foreign countries' wage earnings in the textile world: Japan, 13.6 cents; India, 9.5 cents; England, 40 cents; Germany, 31.7 cents per hour.

Tufting machines made in America are being exported to foreign countries in increasing numbers. The production potential of these machines, plus that of tufting machines manufactured in foreign countries, pose a serious threat to American industries if the products of these machines turned out by low-paid foreign workers are allowed to enter into our domestic market and compete with products produced in the United States.

We would emphasize that the tufting machine was invented and perfected in the United States; that its value in producing certain consumer textile goods is recognized throughout the world; and that the sharing of American production knowledge and export of American tufting machines have been of great value to foreign countries.

The tufted-textile industry is principally that a converter. Cotton is the principal fiber used in the industry—cotton raised in the United States and spun by cotton mills in the United States. When you disturb, by low tariffs the economic condition of this industry, you affect the cotton mills and the cotton growers, as well as all others in this country who supply the industry.

The net profits on sales in the industry have already reached a peril point. To quote Dun & Bradstreet's publication, Behind the Scenes of Business, 1952 edition, "The 5-year average, 1947-51: Net profits on net sales for cotton goods converters, nonfactored, was 2.37 percent."

Tufted products produced in foreign countries up to the present time are inferior in quality to American products. If introduced into the American market, they would tend to establish a low price base, which would have an insidious effect upon the industry's entire price structure and would seriously affect our domestic tufted industry.

When the basic price structure of retail merchandising of given products in the country is undermined, or there are depressed prices, it is then felt in the wage structure of an industry. There is then a lowering of basic standards in the industry to the point where the affected products in many cases are discontinued in the retail merchants' stores.

The tufted-textile industry is now a large link in the economic structure of this country and a most vital segment in the overall textile industry. Tufted-textile products rank fourth in the use of cotton. In addition, it has played a major role in lifting the living standard in the American homes of all means.

Tufted-textile products, principal market is the United States. The small amount of export which is done is principally to Canada. At one time the industry enjoyed a fair amount of export business. However, with foreign countries now establishing tufting machinery in their factories and their patronizing of their home factories, and because of import restrictions by most foreign countries, there is practically no exporting of tufted products from this country, even though our standards for tufted products are far superior to those found in foreign tufting plants.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, in the 83d Congress, together with my colleague the gentleman from New York [Mrs. KELLY] and several other of my colleagues, I sponsored a resolution providing for the creation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters. The number of that measure was House Concurrent Resolution 169. It provided that the committee be composed of 9 Members of the Senate and 9 Members of the House, the Members to be selected by the presiding officers of the two houses, and to be representative of both political parties. That measure was intended to bring the various intelligence

activities of the executive branch under coordinated congressional scrutiny.

Today I am reintroducing that resolution together with several distinguished Members of this House. It is our hope that other Members will shortly join us in cosponsoring this measure.

Mr. Speaker, the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and of related intelligence services have been handled from a congressional standpoint in a piece-meal fashion. The importance of these activities to the national security demands at this time the creation of a joint committee, which will keep the Congress informed and bring these activities under coordinated, responsible congressional scrutiny. The proposed committee would operate in a manner which has been successfully adopted by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Intelligence has developed as an activity of utmost importance since World War II. The agencies in this field are entitled to a continuous, consistent and stable relationship with the Congress. The membership of the Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters, which would be presumably drawn from those charged with responsibility for military and foreign policy matters, would supply this important link in this crucial area.

In recent years it has become apparent that the intelligence agencies activities of the executive branch have been and may in the future be subjected to undue interference by free-wheeling, congressional investigating committees, which consider themselves called upon to inquire into their operations. The proposed Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters would obviate the need for such separate uncoordinated investigations.

It is my sincere hope that the concurrent resolution, the text of which I shall now read into the Record, will receive prompt and favorable consideration from this House:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring). That there is hereby established a Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters to be composed of 9 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and 9 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance not more than 5 Members shall be members of the same political party.

Sec. 2. The joint committee shall make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and problems relating to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security and of its coordination and utilization by the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government. The Central Intelligence Agency and related intelligence services shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to their activities. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or the House of Representatives relating primarily to the Central Intelligence Agency and related intelligence services shall be referred to the joint committee. The members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to time report to the House, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are (1) referred to

the joint committee or (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

Sec. 3. Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

Sec. 4. The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

Sec. 5. The joint committee is empowered to appoint such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

Sec. 6. The expenses of the joint committee, which shall not exceed \$ per year, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives upon vouchers signed by the chairman. Disbursements to pay such expenses shall be made by the Secretary of the Senate out of the contingent fund of the Senate, such contingent fund to be reimbursed from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives in the amount of one-half of the disbursement so made.

Mrs. KELLY of New York. Mr. Speaker, on July 20, 1953, with my distinguished colleagues [Mr. ZABLOCKI, of Wisconsin, and Mr. JUMP, of Minnesota] I introduced a House concurrent resolution to establish a joint committee of Congress to supervise all intelligence activities. I have reintroduced this measure today and I understand several of my colleagues are also submitting it.

I was interested to note that a resolution similar to mine was introduced in the Senate in 1954, and a slightly modified version of it is receiving extensive sponsorship in this Congress. Certainly, Mr. Speaker, this points up the importance of this measure and gives rise to the hope that it will be enacted in this session.

In 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency was created. It is responsible to the National Security Council only and is not subject to supervision by the legislative branch of the Government. It is absolutely free from any check by the Congress even to the control of its expenditures. The need for secrecy in our intelligence agencies is obvious, yet I feel that much of the abuse of the Central Intelligence Agency can be avoided by the creation of a joint committee of Congress to supervise all intelligence activities along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The resolution I have introduced today would establish a joint committee composed of 9 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and 9 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. In each instance,

no more than 5 members shall be members of the same political party. The resolution further provides that the committee shall make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and problems relating to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security and of its coordination and utilization by the various departments and agencies of the Government.

The House and the Senate measures differ only in the proposed composition of the committee to be established. In the House resolution the membership of the committee comprises 18 members while in the Senate resolution only 12 would be appointed. The Senate resolution further specifies that the members be selected from the Appropriations and the Armed Services Committees of the House and the Senate.

Mr. Speaker, I feel this resolution should receive a high priority for consideration in this session. During the past year, President Eisenhower found it necessary to create the Intelligence Activities Task Force headed by Gen. Mark Clark and a personal study conducted by Gen. James Doolittle, to investigate the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The findings of both groups are secret. It is highly important that the Congress have a continuing check on this Agency and necessary changes in it should be promptly written into legislation.

PROTECTION OF THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

(Mr. BENTLEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include newspaper articles.)

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Speaker, I would like to associate myself with the remarks already made by my good friend and former fellow casualty the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. DAVIS] regarding the question of security in this House, or the absolute lack of it so far as I am concerned.

As you might know, I normally expect when I go back to my State and district to be asked, as I was last year several times, what security measures have been taken since the episode of last March 1st. I am asked if professional police have been employed at the Capitol or just what has been done to protect the membership.

I am forced to inform them that the only additional protection furnished since that time has been temporary inclusion in the Capitol Police Force of 10 detectives on loan from the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia, which has cost the District about \$30,000, and which has not been repaid.

I have to tell my constituents back home when I am asked the question as to what has been done since last March that about the only changes we can see in the House are that some of the bullet holes have been patched up in the ceiling, they have patched up the holes in the walls, and repaired some of the furniture that was splintered; they have made various changes like that, but so far as improvement of security is con-

cerned I have been unable to find any of it.

I helped support last year, Mr. Speaker, a bill which passed this body, H. R. 9413, to establish a professional police force, a bill which unfortunately did not pass the other body. I sincerely hope that legislation such as this, or that about which my colleague from Tennessee has spoken, will be introduced in this session of Congress and will pass both Houses as quickly as possible.

The next strange lady who walks down the aisle and asks for recognition from the Chair may have some other intention in her mind than simply making a speech.

Mr. Speaker, we have heard statements today about the propriety of remarks made by Members of one body of this Congress relating to Members of the other body. While the rules protect against character assassination and character assassins, yet we do not have any protection against any other kind of assassination as far as this House is concerned.

[From the Washington Evening Star of January 15, 1955]

CAPITOL INSECURITY

The ease with which the woman in red reached the rostrum of the House directs attention anew to the inadequacy of the present guard system at the Capitol. The woman told reporters later that only a page boy questioned her as she sought to enter the Chamber. "I don't think they could keep anybody out of there," she commented.

It may be that the incident would have occurred even if the House had been protected by a trained police force. But the fact is that the lax security system still in effect at the Capitol, despite last year's shooting affray, makes it relatively easy for unauthorized persons to violate floor or gallery rules. After the Puerto Rican attack on House Members last March there were vociferous demands on both sides of the Capitol for a reorganization of the police force, starting with the elimination of political patronage. But legislation to effect this urgent reform died with the past session.

In the meantime the new Congress has asked the Metropolitan Police Department to detail 10 picked detectives daily to assist in protecting the Capitol. Chief Murray can ill afford to lose the services of these men. A similar special assignment cost the department nearly \$30,000 last year, for which no repayment has been made to date. This makeshift arrangement is unsatisfactory from every standpoint. Congress ought to forget patronage and reorganize the Capitol Police Force on an efficient, merit-system basis. Until that is done the legislators will have no one but themselves to blame for lax security.

[From the Washington Sunday Star of January 16, 1955]

CAPITOL FORCE STILL PATRONAGE PLUM

(By Hector McLean)

Of Congress it might be said: "Experience is a great teacher—but not for long."

Less than a year ago, on March 1, 1954, a band of Puerto Rican terrorists stood up in the House visitors' gallery and turned it into a shooting gallery.

They sprayed the House Chamber with automatic gunfire that cut down 5 Members of Congress and drove others cringing to the floor during a crowded moment of voting.

Then it was over. The memory lingered on, however, at least for those lawmakers who literally stood under the guns that day.

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of available engineers requires, too, that industrial and other employers recognize an obligation to develop the full potential of each engineer and to avoid waste of his talents on nontechnical duties.

One aspect of this matter that I should mention briefly is the heavy concentration of our technical manpower on defense and defense-related work. In the latter category I include the atomic weapon and military reactor work of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the research work of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in the aerodynamics and aircraft propulsion fields. It is estimated that these defense lines use about one-half of the total research and development potential of the country. This is not to say that the results of these programs are useful exclusively for defense, as there are, of course, many by-products of value to our civilian economy; nor does it imply that the nondefense half of the total national research and development effort is without benefit to defense since, in the long-range sense, defense technology is founded, in large measure, on the fundamental research in our universities and other similar institutions, and on the technology developed in our civilian industry.

In my judgment, this great concentration of our scientific and technological resources on the problems of defense is not only justified but necessitated by the world situation in which we find ourselves. To do less would jeopardize our position of technological superiority so essential to our long-term security. On the other hand, to attempt to use directly on defense projects a bigger proportion of our total potential might be unwise as a long-term program, particularly when one considers the interdependence of the military and civilian fields.

Atomic energy has been a key topic of this assembly. There is no doubt in my mind that it deserves this kind of treatment. Some here have been associated with the program from its earliest beginning. One might say we are just entering the third era—the first was research and crash military development culminating in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs; the second was also dominated by the military requirements, culminating in our 1954 thermonuclear experiments; and the third or power reactor phase had its roots in the first two but might be said to have been ushered in by the launching of the *Nautilus* a year ago. Several significant things have happened since. Congress passed the Cole-Hickenlooper Atomic Energy Act last summer which opened up the field for private enterprise to come in and develop it for the greater good and welfare of the country. In line with the President's leadership, Congress also made provision for sharing our very valuable power-reactor know-how and even moderate amounts of nuclear materials with other countries to make it possible for them to share with us the great benefits of this new technology. On Labor Day, the President, by remote control, broke ground for the first large commercial powerplant, first in this country, and so far as we know, first of its size and kind in the world. This, in fact, is just one instance of the many ways in which our Atomic Energy Commission is cooperating with private industry in this field.

Looking to the future, the Commission is spending an estimated \$8.5 million a year on general reactor research and development work and is well into a 5-year civilian power reactor development program estimated to cost nearly \$200 million. The program calls for the building of five power reactors of as many different types, which were chosen to be the most promising for eventually leading to economic power.

While all of these are experimental and only one can be called large, they will serve for a period of testing and operation and as the prototypes of large plants where the experimental results are sufficiently promising.

Nuclear power is also of great potential military importance and, in addition to the *Nautilus* there are half a dozen military projects underway, notably to apply nuclear propulsion to aircraft, to large naval vessels as well as submarines, and to an Army project for the development of a semiportable powerplant for field use.

There is, of course, a close interplay between this military project and the general reactor development mentioned earlier. Taken as a whole they constitute a very broad and progressive national program that will, no doubt, have a very important impact on the development of the industry, both in this country and abroad, in this last half of the 20th century.

One can hardly deal with the matter of nuclear power without raising a basic question of national policy as to the proper place of the Government in this field. The question is complicated by the fact that, for good and sufficient reasons, the Government arrives at the present crossroads with an absolute monopoly in the field, and with national security reasons for perpetuating some aspects of the monopoly. This poses a difficult question. On the one hand it is apparent that, if we really believe in free enterprise and in getting the Government out of all business activities except those that are necessary in the public interest and that cannot be properly performed by private enterprise, then the time certainly has come to start getting the Government out of the atomic power business. On the other hand, there are plausible arguments that the people's money has been spent to develop the art and to produce the fissionable or nuclear fuel materials and that the Government should therefore exploit and operate the power plants for the people. Of course, the hitch in this argument is the hidden premise that Government operation of such power systems would be in the best interest of the people. I, at least, believe that it would not and therefore I take great satisfaction in the enactment by Congress of the Cole-Hickenlooper Act which, while not proscribing Government operation, wisely provided for an orderly transition to private ownership and operation of nuclear-power facilities.

In closing I should like to return to a subject I touched on in my opening remarks, namely the organization of the engineering profession. This subject has been worked over on so many different occasions by so many different groups and with such care and competence that I offer my views with some trepidation. Without further apology, however, I suggest:

1. That the guiding principle should be to serve the public welfare; and only to serve the interests of groups of engineers, no matter how large, to the extent that this is incidental to serving the public welfare. I believe this is in the enlightened self-interest of the profession.
2. The Unity organization should have professional standards of membership. Membership should be open to all who meet such standards, either directly or through membership in a constituent society. I feel that State registration should not be a necessary requirement, at least under present circumstances.
3. The Unity organization should be effective in developing the views of the profession; in developing policy for the profession; and in representing the profession in the formulation of national policy. If this kind of effectiveness can only be achieved by individual dues-paying membership then I am

for such membership but this has never seemed to me to be a paramount consideration. I am sure, however, that the federation concept will only work if there is a sense of urgency in the member bodies to make it work.

It is tremendously heartening to see this enthusiastic assembly of representatives, not only of the constituent societies of EJC but also of many other national and regional bodies with the common bond of professional interest in the engineering field. It is obvious that great progress is being made in drawing the profession together under a Unity organization, and I pay tribute to the many leaders of the profession who have contributed to this end, including the first president of the expanded EJC, Mr. Pigott on my right, and our chairman, Dean Saville on my left, who is just embarking on his second very noteworthy term as president of our joint council.

I appreciate more than I can tell you, the opportunity you have given me to take part in this historic first assembly.

Eyes on Intelligence

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. VERA BUCHANAN

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 2, 1955

Mrs. BUCHANAN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to include in the RECORD an editorial from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette of January 31, 1955.

The editorial calls attention to a resolution introduced in the Senate for the creation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters. A resolution for a similar purpose has been introduced in this House, and I am happy to be one of the cosponsors of it.

EYES ON INTELLIGENCE

A resolution that deserves the early attention of Congress has been introduced by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana, on behalf of a bipartisan group of 38 Senators. The measure would create a joint 12-member congressional committee, similar to that on atomic energy, to supervise the Central Intelligence Agency.

Much of the activity of the Central Intelligence Agency, like that of the Atomic Energy Commission, is secret and not subject to routine scrutiny by Congress. Yet if the CIA is to be ultimately answerable to the American people for what it does all over the world, it should come under the regular observation of elected officials. It should be subject to the system of checks and balances designed to prevent any one department from becoming too autocratic.

A committee of Senators and Representatives could facilitate the handling of CIA legislative business. Like the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, it could, when secrecy is essential, hear testimony in executive session without the necessity of repetition such as occurs when two committees of Congress must deal with the same question. The proposed joint committee would bring under systematic review an agency of Government which, to its detriment, now only attracts congressional eyes when some sensational suspicion about it is voiced.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

February 2

Total Defense or Total War**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF****HON. RICHARD BOLLING**

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 2, 1955

Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, on next Monday, February 7, I expect to reintroduce my concurrent resolution providing for a study of the economics of atomic defense by a joint committee of the Congress. In the 83d Congress this was House Concurrent Resolution 229. In this connection there follows a speech I delivered at a luncheon of members of the National Planning Association last December:

TOTAL DEFENSE OR TOTAL WAR

Today, I will attempt to raise questions not to answer them. But before doing even that there must be some preliminaries.

In the first place, let us assume, and we are supported by the excellent NPA study of Gerhardt Colm, that the American economy can afford much larger expenditures for total defense than those currently being made or planned.

Secondly, let us assume that in 15 years or less the Communist bloc will possess large numbers of guided missiles with atomic and hydrogen warheads and speed of thousands of miles an hour and that there will be no effective way of preventing most of such missiles from arriving in the vicinity of their targets.

Today the United States still has a lead in the air-atomic armaments race. So-called massive retaliation even now can force stalemate in terms of the big war. However, we and our allies apparently have neither the programs nor the forces to prevent the deterioration in our position in the Far East which is so evident in Indochina.

There are many ways to lose freedom. It need not disappear in a cataclysmic clap of atomic thunder. It may. But its strength may also be destroyed by the less dramatic destruction of peoples, seduced or conquered by more conventional totalitarian tactics.

From one point of view, the point of view of previous poorer performances, it may be said that the democracies have done well in their efforts since 1946. From another point of view, that of the future, it may be that we have only done well enough to prolong a process leading to an ultimate defeat. That we have not yet arrived at the point where defeat is inevitable is my conviction. I am equally convinced that unless we do better than we have in preparing our defenses our defeat may soon become inevitable.

Some of us believe that one of the primary reasons for that condition is the fact that we have never succeeded in arriving at a balanced and whole policy of advancing democracy, or, if you insist, of defense against Communist aggression. Today there must be not a foreign policy, a defense policy and a domestic policy, but one policy which includes all these and is the policy.

Most of us here will agree that our efforts beyond our shores depend on a growing domestic economy. Without an effective foreign policy to maintain and strengthen the coalition of democratic peoples, an air-atomic striking force twice as large as necessary would not save us. Without adequate strength in the more familiar weapons of warfare there can be no effective policy to prevent the gradual destruction of the nations which seek to practice democracy but

are not yet in a position to defend their sovereignty. Without the best in early warning, continental air defense and civil defense, an enemy is actually encouraged to have hope of success in an all-out stab-to-the-heart attack.

There have been too many special pleaders, too many over-simplifications, too many exaggerations by the proponents of one element or another of the whole defense we need. No one method of defense will succeed without the others. And we need not choose from among necessities because we think we cannot afford all.

It was with these points in mind that early last summer House Concurrent Resolution 229 which provides for a study by a special joint committee of Congress into the economics of atomic defense was introduced.

The details of the resolution are not too important. It will be reintroduced, perhaps with some modifications. But what it might lead to could be very important. It may even be that whether or not Congress acts on it will prove to be the difference between war and peace. You notice the use of the word "may," not some more positive word. Frankly, no one knows whether effective dispersion of people and plants is practicable or wise. I strongly suspect that it is. I even suspect as I said before that effective dispersion can tip the balance to peace. But I do not know this for the simple reason that the facts do not exist upon which to base an intelligent decision.

Excellent studies have been made in this area—once excellent but now largely out of date because they were based on the existence of A-bombs only. One hears that various top-level members of the administration are studying the new problems raised by the H-bomb. What they will come up with I do not know. But I have the impression that at least some of their minds are frozen in the notion that a balanced budget is essential to our defense.

At any event, right now we do not have the facts on which to base a decision. Presumably if there were no limits to the amount of money and effort we could expend and if we did not care what happened to our free society, the decision to disperse effectively would have been made and implemented long ago. But since there are limits on our resources and our effort is directed to strengthening a free society, there are preliminary questions which must be answered before we can intelligently answer the larger question.

But, you say, we do have a governmental policy of dispersal, promulgated years ago. Many plants have been dispersed. Fine, but the indications are that the choicest target areas have actually grown more attractive. Apparently, as one man moved out of an area more than one moved in. If one factory dispersed, larger ones did not. Our efforts have not been adequate to achieve our purpose. The problem of concentration still remains.

Here are a few of the questions which must be asked. If today much of our population and industrial strength is concentrated in 70 urban areas, each a prize target for enemy attack, how much safer can we make ourselves by reducing our concentration by 100 percent? By 500 percent? How much more effort would it take for an enemy to effectively attack 350 urban areas rather than just 70? Would the problems of our own military defense be increased five times also? What would such a program do toward making civil defense easier and more effective? Or would dispersion in fact make civil defense harder? Or does the dreadful area of radiation contamination, which an H-bomb explosion creates, make the whole problem of civil defense impossible?

Let us suppose the answers to all these questions demonstrated that selective dispersion would be very valuable as a defense measure—as a measure of defense so effective as to play a real part in deterring an enemy, willing to use surprise attack, from launching such an attack. Then we must answer: the even more difficult questions of how to accomplish dispersion.

What would be the cost of this massive task? How long would it take? Who would pay for it? By what means? How could it be accomplished without using the methods of authoritarianism? In other words, how could the people in a society in which each individual homeowner and entrepreneur has and must have a large area of free choice, be persuaded that it is in their interests to participate in dispersal—even at some inconvenience or perhaps personal or corporate cost? And, of course, the people's participation would include paying for dispersion personally or through some level of government.

Unless I am in error, well-founded answers to most of these questions are not available. In part, no doubt, because of the swiftness of events. We read that the last hydrogen bomb greatly exceeded in yield even the expectations of its inventors. It is perhaps not much of an exaggeration to say that the age of fusion is as different from the age of fission as the latter is from that ancient day, 10 years ago, when all man had was blockbusters. Our minds, our imaginations lag behind. And this lag, of course, may be more fatal to mankind than radiation.

There is no reason why we should not have the answers to all the questions which must be answered before we can decide the big question of the desirability and the feasibility of dispersion. We do not have them because too few of us have asked the questions and demanded answers. I believe that we have the ingenuity to devise means of encouraging the people in our mixed economy to disperse their homes and their places of business without spending more money than we can afford and without significantly decreasing the number or character of our free choices. I believe that dispersion can significantly decrease our vulnerability to surprise attack by making the chances of success in such an attack much less likely. But in this case, much more than the belief of a few is needed. We must have facts and conclusions. It is not that these facts are so difficult to obtain. Rather we have not bothered to get them. Certainly, it need not cost as much as even one atomic bomber to determine the answers to these questions and the others we need to answer. Should the answers add up to the conclusion that dispersion would not be practicable or effective, that, in itself, would be important and valuable. But should the studies reveal that dispersion can be effective and that ways can be devised to achieve effective dispersion without undue strain either on our economy or our institutions, then the cause of peace might be advanced appreciably.

In our ignorance there is no bliss. Freedom cannot afford such ignorance.

I care not at all whether these studies are made by Congress, the Executive, or private groups. I care only that we use to the fullest that great advantage which democracy has over totalitarianism, its ability, at least in greater measure, to make decisions based on facts and to constantly seek for more facts and more knowledge. Our discipline is that of self. We have nothing to be proud of in the history of our attempt as a people to pretend that first the A-bomb and now the H-bomb do not exist. We must face the facts, but first we must know them.

HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, the Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities of the Executive Branch was submitted earlier today to the Congress. I would like to say a few words about this report.

The task force of the Hoover Commission, headed by Gen. Mark Clark and including such distinguished men as Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker, Adm. Richard L. Connolly, Lt. Gov. Ernest F. Hollings, of South Carolina, Dr. Donald S. Russell, and Harry Kearns, spent 8 months investigating United States intelligence activities both at home and abroad. The report submitted by this distinguished group is both enlightening and encouraging. It indicates that the task force has found no valid ground for the suspicion that our intelligence agencies are infested with security risks. The Commission further reported that our Government intelligence activities are led by sincere and dedicated men, and that the personnel recruitment programs of the intelligence agencies is reassuring.

The Commission did find, however, that there are improvements which should be made in this vital field. I believe that it is of particular significance that the Commission recommended the establishment of a "watchdog" committee to review and check the operations and the expenditures of our nine major intelligence agencies.

In this respect, the Commission's recommendations parallel and support the proposal which I have been advocating during the past 3 years—the proposal embodied in House Concurrent Resolution 28, calling for the establishment of a Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters.

During the 1st session of the 83d Congress, together with the gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. KELLY], I sponsored House Concurrent Resolution 169, which called for the creation of such a joint committee. I reintroduced this proposal in the present Congress, and I was delighted when 19 other Members joined in sponsoring similar resolutions. This action demonstrated the growing awareness of the dire need for closer congressional review of our intelligence activities.

As I pointed out on a number of other occasions, our intelligence activities have been handled from a congressional standpoint in a piecemeal fashion. The importance of these activities to our national security demands that they be brought under responsible scrutiny. The proposed Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters would be an appropriate body to perform this vital task.

I was, indeed, pleased when I learned that the Hoover Commission in effect concurred in the sentiments which I have been expressing for the past 3 years by recommending the establishment of a watchdog congressional committee to oversee the administrative and financial operations of our intelligence agencies. I earnestly hope that this recommenda-

tion will aid in securing early consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 28 by the Rules Committee, or by some other appropriate group. My efforts will continue to be devoted to the attainment of this end.

ANNOUNCEMENT

Mr. DAVIS of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, when rollcall No. 99 took place I was unavoidably detained from the House. Had I been present I would have voted "yea."

TRADE AGREEMENT DETRIMENTS MULTIPLY

(Mr. PHILBIN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD in two instances.)

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, every day some new protest reaches me containing concrete evidence of the unfair effects upon segments of American industry of the recent trade treaty agreements with Japan at Geneva.

In my recent remarks relative to this subject, I discussed principally the textile industry, but there are other industries in my district that will be profoundly and adversely affected by this latest example of under-the-table negotiations and ill-considered concessions, which our American representatives recently were responsible for at Geneva.

I am particularly concerned also about the direct effect upon certain branches of the precision industry business since under the new Japanese agreements some of the competitive products of this industry will be able to come into the United States in larger volume and that perhaps will have a devastating effect on businesses located in my own district, and on others throughout the Nation.

It has come to my attention, moreover, that our State Department concluded these negotiations and made these incredible concessions without substantial consultation with the industries affected. No reasonable person would construe that a mere opportunity to submit views in opposition to pending proposals on a solely unilateral basis before the Committee on Reciprocity Information could possibly fulfill the requirements for hearing and consultation contemplated by the Congress in legislation governing trade treaties.

I do not have the slightest doubt that the officials charged with negotiating these treaties had full information concerning the adverse effects upon the industries in question caused by imports during the past few years. It is clear, also, that the agency well knew that some of these industries were trying to work out a fair, equitable solution of their problems with other Government agencies charged with a degree of responsibility in these matters.

It is my personal belief that, in enacting this legislation, the Congress assumed that its provisions would be complied with in letter and in spirit and that industries and parties, which would be adversely affected by proposed tariff rate decreases would have those oppor-

tunities to present their views and objections, which are characteristic of and inherent in the due process clause of our Constitution as affecting administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings. The requirements of this long-established principle is never complied with by mere colorable pretenses and gestures. There must be substantial and full opportunity given under law to aggrieved parties, not only to present their views and voice their objections, but to combat the views and claims of opposing interests.

From current information, I do not believe that this standard has been met in laying the basis for the trade concessions made to Japan at Geneva, and I think that the action taken arbitrarily and, in a sense, so furtively, is not only contrary to accepted principles of American political and judicial procedure, but will cause damage and havoc to some of the industries which, as a result thereof, will be forced to compete against the low, sweatshop peonage-system standards of other nations.

These industries have a right to know where they stand. They have a right to be heard, not colorably, but honestly, fairly, and fully. They have a right to present all their views. They have a right to contend against the views of other interested groups. They have the right to be treated under American principles of law and equity.

The American people are entitled to an answer to the questions implicit in this situation:

Will the views of bleeding hearts, one-worlders, and extreme internationalists dominate our governmental policy respecting trade treaties?

Will hugh trusts and combines, possessed of powerful secret influences in political councils, representing multi-billion-dollar export industries, be permitted to secure overriding favorable consideration in trade-treaty matters adverse to other business interests and adverse to American workers and adverse to American standards of living?

Will we have fair-trade treaties predicated on fair hearings that will give proper weight to our own national interests, or will we pursue the fantastic, unsound program of giveaway and harmful concessions that are inevitably bound to impair and weaken the American industrial structure and displace millions of our faithful workers?

Will this program be operated for the interests of Americans or for the interests of foreign nations?

These are questions which the American people want answered, and I doubt very much that our great President would ever take the position that they should not be answered affirmatively, in a way that would indicate strongly that in word and deed, in thought, and in action, he intends to protect American interests and American workers.

I admit that the position of those of us who oppose the objectives, methods, and techniques of the trade treaties as presently operating is unenviable and exceedingly difficult. The Congress has just passed another trade-treaty law. The State Department has just been armed with a fresh mandate. It is no-

table that the terms of the Japanese agreements were not released until this mandate had been received from the Congress. Nevertheless, the organic law, as recently adopted by Congress, we were assured, contained safeguards to protect American industry damaged or threatened to be damaged by the operation of any of these treaties. I hope that the President will personally insist that these protective provisions are carried out in their entirety, and I most respectfully urge that he give this question his able, personal attention.

I do not speak in support of any narrow provincial point of view. Like most Americans, I believe in trade with other nations on a mutually and advantageous basis. But I must protest again as strongly as I possibly can against the end result of the Japanese agreements and the methods by which they were consummated. If such disregard for fundamental American principles are allowed to dominate this program, and if such concessions as have been made in this instance are extended to other industries as well may be the case, I hate to think of what will happen to American industry, because in that event, in not too distant future time, much of it will be crippled and laid prostrate by massive, cutthroat foreign competition which it cannot meet under any conditions.

I earnestly hope that the President and the Department will consider the plight of these affected industries and move before it is too late to apply remedies and to extend them a helping hand in keeping alive the prosperity of their business, in protecting the employment of millions of Americans, who, together with their families and communities, are so gravely affected.

REVISE ICC RATES HARMING PORT OF BOSTON

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I am greatly disturbed about the decline of the business at the port of Boston in relation to other ports on the eastern seaboard.

Boston is a great historic and industrial city, the center of thriving business enterprise and rich culture. It has made incalculably valuable contributions throughout our national history, which are well known to all Members of Congress and the American people and need no reiteration by me.

A principal reason for the decline in the port of Boston, unfortunately, has to do with the current inland rail rate differential, which the ports of Baltimore and Philadelphia have long enjoyed over Boston to and from territory west of Buffalo and Pittsburgh.

I am the last to want to raise sectional questions on the floor of this House, because I earnestly and honestly believe in keeping all sections of the United States prosperous and strong. In this instance, however, it is clear to me, and I believe it can be substantiated by the facts, that grossly discriminatory railway rates are in substantial measure responsible for the steady, alarming de-

cline of Boston port business. These rates are, not only discriminatory, but they are unfair and unjust since they permit other cities to enjoy advantages and to receive benefits that are not given to Boston under the rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

It is unfortunate that these conditions were ever permitted to arise. Such discriminatory rates never should have been established in the first place. Now that they are a definite reality, however, and are inflicting such extensive damage to the port of Boston, they should be immediately revised so that rates between Boston and other ports are equalized, as they should be under sound, fair principles of law.

It may well be that at an early date, this question will be presented again to the Interstate Commerce Commission and at that time I intend to make my views known to that agency and urge the elimination of current discriminatory rates and the establishment of fair rates that will put the port of Boston on a parity with every other port on the northeastern seaboard.

Boston is the great port of New England. It is tied to the New England economy which in turn is tied to the rich sources of raw materials and markets of other sections of the country. Of late years our section has undergone marked industrial, social, and economic changes which are still in process. For complex reasons many of our industries have moved to other States where lower labor and social standards and government grants and subsidies have created more favorable conditions. New England and Massachusetts pay huge sums in taxes to the Federal Government but receive comparatively little in return by way of special Government grants.

There is a shifting of population and redistribution of industry taking place in Boston. Desire to relocate in the periphery of the metropolitan district or even beyond it in smaller communities removed from stagnating traffic congestion and in the sunshine and fresh air of less settled areas where property costs and tax rates are more consonant with the financial means of average families, has contributed to these shifts.

The St. Lawrence seaway now under construction is expected to divert additional heavy traffic and business from the port of Boston. In this event there will be even greater urgency for the elimination of the current discriminatory and baneful rate differential. In the interest of our great port, I propose to render every assistance in my power to promote a just readjustment of the rates in question when this matter is pending before the ICC.

HOUR OF MEETING TOMORROW

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet tomorrow at 10 o'clock.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

NATIONAL OLYMPIC DAY

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the resolution (H. J. Res. 359) to authorize the designation of October 22, 1955, as National Olympic Day.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

Whereas the XVth Olympic games of the modern era will be held in Melbourne, Australia, November 22 to December 8, 1956, with Winter Games to be held at Cortina d'Ampezzo, Italy, January 26 to February 5, 1956; and

Whereas these games will afford an opportunity of bringing together young men and women representing more than 70 nations, of many races, creeds, and stations in life and possessing various habits and customs, all bound by the universal appeal of friendly athletic competition, governed by rules of sportsmanship and dedicated to the principle that the important thing is for each and every participant to do his very best to win in a manner that will reflect credit upon himself or herself, and the country represented; and

Whereas the peoples of the world in these trying times require above all else occasions for friendship and understanding, and among the most telling things which influence people of other countries are the acts of individuals and not those of governments; and

Whereas experiences afforded by the Olympic games make a unique contribution to common understanding and mutual respect among all peoples; and

Whereas previous Olympic games have proved that competitors and spectators alike have been imbued with ideals of friendship, chivalry, and comradeship and impressed with the fact that accomplishment is reward in itself; and

Whereas the United States Olympic Association is presently engaged in assuring maximum support for the teams representing the United States at Melbourne and Cortina d'Ampezzo; and

Whereas a day set aside by this Nation for a rededication to the amateur ideal could accomplish great good in encouraging good will for these games; Therefore be it

Resolved, etc., That the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the 22d of October 1955 as National Olympic Day and urging all citizens of our country to do all in their power to support the XVth Olympic games and the Winter Games to be held in 1956, and to insure that the United States will be fully and adequately represented in these games.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

BILL DESIGNED TO OFFSET DECLINING EMPLOYMENT

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Flood] is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. FLOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Control Over CIA Not Impractical

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 8, 1956

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I wish to recommend to the attention of the membership of this body an editorial which appeared in the Milwaukee Journal on March 6, 1956, entitled "Some Congressional Control Over CIA Is Not Impractical."

During the last 3 years, I have exerted repeated efforts on behalf of the proposal to establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence Matters. I have first outlined my proposal on this subject, in House Concurrent Resolution 169, 83d Congress and reintroduced it, in an amended version, in House Concurrent Resolution 28, 84th Congress, together with over a score of my distinguished colleagues.

It is my sincere hope that the House Rules Committee will report House Concurrent Resolution 28 in the near future.

SOME CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER CIA IS NOT IMPRACTICAL

For several years there has been a rash of resolutions in Congress calling for an agency to watch over the Central Intelligence Agency, our top cloak and dagger corps.

The second Hoover Commission called for the same thing. It suggested that a small, permanent commission composed of a bipartisan representation from Congress and distinguished private citizens handle the job.

President Eisenhower has gone halfway. He recently named a civilian commission in the executive branch to serve as watchdog and report to him. But he has shied away from letting Congress in on the act. This hasn't stilled demands that Congress take a hand in watching an agency for which it appropriates money. Senator MANSFIELD, Democrat, Montana, has come up with a bill to create a joint committee of both Houses of Congress to work with the CIA. The Senate Rules Committee has agreed to congressional action on the bill and it has attracted a large measure of support.

The Hoover Commission pointed out that the CIA, because it needs a large degree of secrecy to operate, is exempted by law from rules that control other Government agencies. For instance, the General Services Administration, the Government's housekeeper, has no control over CIA at all. CIA is exempted "from compliance with any provision of law limiting transfers of appropriations; any requirements for publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the agency; and any regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds."

Such exemptions are, by and large, proper. The Atomic Energy Commission has similar exemptions. But Congress does have to appropriate funds for the CIA. It created the

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Agency and set its scope of activities. Surely someone in Congress should be given at least peek enough to make sure that CIA is operating efficiently and properly. This is particularly true because of criticisms—some from the Hoover Commission itself—of some shortcomings in CIA.

The AEC, which hoards secrets, too, has a Joint Congressional Committee which is given enough of a picture to judge whether the organization is handling Government funds properly. The Joint Committee has worked exceedingly well, and without weakening national security. The same sort of committee could do the same sort of job for CIA. It wouldn't have to be told everything—and shouldn't.

But Congress ought to be able to determine whether the dagger is being kept sharp and the cloak is kept cleaned and pressed and buttoned. It's basic that Congress, with control of the purse, must get enough information to make an informed judgment on how the purse is expended.

That's all MANSFIELD and others want—and it's little enough to ask.

American-Flag Airlines

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DeWITT S. HYDE

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 12, 1956

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, last week the Denver Chamber of Commerce was privileged to hear an address by a constituent, Willis Player, of Chevy Chase, vice president of Air Transport Association. I was privileged to receive a copy of Mr. Player's talk and after reading it I found myself immensely impressed with the logic which he so eloquently expressed.

Mr. Player is greatly concerned over the future of United States-flag international carriers who are faced with unbelievable odds in their competition with foreign airlines.

As you know, our foreign competitors are almost entirely owned by their governments. They are highly subsidized and pay salary scales one-third lower than our high rate of pay in the airline industry—from pilot captains right down to the apprentice mechanic. They find themselves in the remarkable position of receiving from our Government in compensatory mail pay more than our Government pays our own carriers for exactly the same service.

Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I present the attached excerpt from Willis Player's speech:

The second condition involves the country's important international air services, and the condition is this: The Federal Government should give American-flag airlines treatment at least equal to that accorded by our own Government to foreign-flag airlines.

It is American-flag airline management that I know of thinks that foreign-flag airlines should not be welcomed to the United States. The foreign-flag airlines of the free world are important elements in freedom's total strength. But the conduct, if not the concept of our international air policy seems, to many close observers, to verge on bankruptcy. It should be possible to reestablish a psychology in which we are as eager to ask for rights as to grant them.

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**MOLYBDENUM PRICE ROLLBACK
ANOTHER L.B.J. ANTI-INFLATION
VICTORY**

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, once again the administration has demonstrated that it is fighting inflation hard and well.

This morning's newspapers announced that the Johnson administration has succeeded in forcing the cancellation of a 5-percent increase in the price of molybdenum that had been announced 6 days ago.

Such a price increase could have been a crucial factor in shoving prices up generally, across the board. For some kinds of high quality steel the molybdenum increase could have added up to \$18 per ton.

Other types of steel also would have been pushed up in price and of course with the bellwether steel prices increases, the whole structure of our industrial pricing would move up. The administration stopped that cold.

The management of American Metals Climax—by far the largest molybdenum producer made that clear in the announcement that the administration had persuaded them not to raise prices after all.

And Mr. President, this price increase should have been rescinded. Economic council chairman Gardner Ackley called the proposed price increase unconscionable. Profits of American Metals Climax related to stockholders equity have been well above the average of industry in the country.

Profits of the molybdenum division of American Metal Climax are more than twice as high as American industry—and this of course is without any price increase.

Mr. President, this tough, fast, effective action of the administration will not make big industry throw their hats in the air. Of course the administration's vigor in holding down prices will be unpopular with much of industry.

But it should be mighty popular with the rest of the country—if only the consumers in the country would take notice of what the administration has done and recognize its significance.

Mr. President, the leveling off of production growth, the reduced volume of new orders, the increase in unemployment since it hit its low several months ago at 3.7 percent and since has risen to 4 percent, the enormous increase in plant capacity in the past 3 years and the huge influx into the labor force, plus the immense upgrading of the skills of that labor force, all suggest that excessive demand is unlikely to cause prices to rise from now on.

But, Mr. President, this doesn't mean that the inflation threat is over. Far from it. What happened in molybdenum—or threatened to happen before the administration stepped in could very easily happen in the rest of industry without a vigorous, alert administration willing to take action, powerful interests don't like.

And there is every possible danger that the wage price guidelines may be so generally and substantially breached—that wage increases might shove prices up.

To enforce—or to try to persuade labor to continue to live by those guidelines—is a hard, unpopular business.

But this is just what the administration is trying to do in precisely such cases as the molybdenum story that the newspapers reported today.

Prices may rise sharply this year as they did from 1957 to 1960 in the face of rising unemployment and falling demand. How can this happen? It can and without tough administration action certainly will happen because of the ability of both labor unions and big business to shove prices or wages or both up simply through superior bargaining power.

And finally, Mr. President—and I might say most important—we should recognize that this molybdenum story is just part of a long fight that started in the Kennedy administration in 1961. When President Kennedy persuaded the United Steel workers to hold down their wage demands. When big steel later broke the agreement and proposed a \$6 a ton increase in steel prices, the President made his historic and winning fight to keep prices down.

Several times subsequently steel prices were held down. The auto agreements a few years later in the Johnson administration were held close to the guidelines and auto prices were kept down. Copper and aluminum companies agreed to rescind announced price increases after Johnson administration warnings and the announcement of stockpile sales.

Just this week we acted on a government pay raise—within the guidelines—as a noninflationary example to the country.

Mr. President, this fight by the Johnson administration against inflation is far too little noted. For the last 5 years—for the first time in American history, we have a national administration that is effectively fighting to keep prices down.

The good news on molybdenum today is a fine example of that struggle.

I ask unanimous consent that the article from the New York Times to which I have referred be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**GOVERNMENT WINS A PRICE ROLLBACK FOR
MOLYBDENUM—TOP PRODUCER ANNOUNCES
RESCISSION OF A 5-PERCENT RISE MADE 6
DAYS BEFORE—LABOR PACTS A FACTOR—
EXPIRING UNION ACCORDS AND STRONG
CORPORATE PROFITS ARE CONSIDERED BY
UNITED STATES**

(By Eileen Shanahan)

WASHINGTON, July 13.—The Administration succeeded today in forcing the cancellation of a 5 per cent price increase on molybdenum announced six days ago.

As the price rescission was announced in New York by American Metal Climax, Inc., the largest producer of molybdenum, Government officials here disclosed their basic motive for applying pressure on the company for the rollback.

They wanted to demonstrate to unions, as much as to management, that the Administration's anti-inflationary wage-price guidelines are not a dead letter.

The announcement came after the close of trading on the New York Stock Exchange and therefore had no impact on the market.

In deciding to make the attempt to force the first outright price rollback since January, the Government had its eye on the airlines mechanics' strike and on the many major labor contracts that expire next year, officials said.

The direct inflationary impact of the molybdenum price increase was also a major factor, officials stressed. They said the price rise, announced on Friday, could add as much as \$18 a ton to certain high-quality steels used in tool-making, which require the use of considerable molybdenum.

STAINLESS STEEL IMPACT

For stainless steel, in which relatively small quantities of molybdenum are used, the direct additional cost would be around 50 cents a ton, they said.

In addition, officials were motivated to make an issue of the molybdenum increase because of the unusually high profits of American Metal Climax, they said. The company's earnings amounted to 27 per cent of stockholder's equity last year, and in its molybdenum division have exceeded 30 per cent, officials said. These figures compared with an average of 13 per cent for all manufacturing corporations.

Even the Administration's consideration of the company's profits was focused in the context of future union demands for big wage increases, however, officials indicated.

They foresee large union demands over the next 12 months or so, partly because industry profits generally are high. The striking airline mechanics, for example have repeatedly emphasized the "unprecedented prosperity" of the airlines.

Among the major labor contracts that will have to be negotiated in the next 12 months are those in the electrical equipment, trucking and rubber industries. Auto industry labor contracts expire next fall. There have been almost no major union contracts that have expired this year.

The Government's pressure on American Metal Climax to rescind the price increase began, so far as the public knew, on Saturday, when Gardner Ackley, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, issued a statement denouncing the increase.

The statement was received with considerable surprise in industry circles, because it had appeared that the Administration had abandoned all attempts to force businesses to lower prices once they had been raised.

Rollbacks were forced on the aluminum and copper industries last fall and a partial rollback on the price of structural steel in January.

Thereafter, while Administration figures publicly criticized certain price increases—on cigarettes, for example, there appeared to be no real attempts to force reversals of price increases that had already been announced.

Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor said flatly at a press conference in May that there would be no more "public confrontations" between the Government and businesses over price increases, although the Administration would continue to exert quiet pressure to prevent or moderate price increases.

Some increases were, in fact, held to less than the manufacturer originally planned, on newsprint, for example, and shoes, after conference with Administration officials.

**CIA FOREIGN RELATIONS
RESOLUTION**

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee has reported out a resolution aimed at replacing the present review operation of Congress over the CIA and other intelligence agencies with a formal committee on Intelligence Operations.

Congressional oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies of similar purpose—such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and others—would rest with a formal nine-member Commission, composed of three members each of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Appropriations Committees. At the present time, oversight of such operations rests with several Members appointed by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Mr. President, such oversight has rested with the Armed Services Committee since the creation of the CIA. There has been no challenge to the functions of the Armed Services Committee in this regard, and I might say that I know of no reason to suppose that the arrangement is not proving viable and effective, as, indeed, it seems to be.

It is obvious that in sensitive and secret matters of this kind, with human lives involved in some aspects of intelligence operations, there is every reason to confine critical information to as few ears as possible.

While it is perhaps true that decisions made by these agencies do have some ultimate bearing on foreign policy, it is also a fact that almost every bill which comes before Congress has ramifications beyond the scope of the particular committee to which it is referred. There is certainly a great deal of correlation in these matters.

I do not think that the present instance is significantly different. If joint jurisdiction and oversight should be accorded both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, then there is no reason why joint jurisdiction should not be accorded committees on any of the many bills which affect more than one legislative area.

As I understand it, the members of the Armed Services Committee who oversee operations of the CIA and other similar agencies have been quite cooperative in providing information to the Foreign Relations Committee on such subjects as the intelligence estimates for various countries, without divulging aspects of their operations.

The reasoning behind the proposal is, in my opinion, rather tenuous; and the justifications for maintaining the present methods of oversight and supervision are strong. There is much to be said for keeping the apparatus of supervision small and select, and I urge that my colleagues vote accordingly. I intend to vote to support the present, quite workable methods.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROPOSED COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I report to the Senate a resolution creating a Committee on Intelligence Operations approved by the Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 14 to 5 on May 17, 1966. On June 27, I sent to all Members of the Senate a copy of this resolution and report for their information. I did so in anticipation of the subject being taken up under the circumstances as they have developed this morning.

Therefore, I report the resolution to the Senate and ask that the clerk read it for the information of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution will be stated for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That there is hereby created, effective at the beginning of the Ninetieth Congress, a committee to be known as the Committee on Intelligence Operations to consist of nine Senators, of whom three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations from among the members of that committee, three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services from among the members of that committee, and three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations from among the members of that committee. No more than two of the members appointed from each such standing committee shall be from the same political party. The chairman of the committee shall be elected by the members.

Sec. 2. It shall be the duty of the Committee on Intelligence Operations to keep itself fully and currently informed of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and other agencies of the Government insofar as the activities of such agencies relate to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. The committee's duties shall include, but not be limited to, review of intelligence and counterintelligence activities and legislative oversight of the coordination of such activities among the various agencies concerned.

Sec. 3. The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to hold such hearings, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, and to take such testimony as it deems advisable.

Sec. 4. A majority of the members of the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that a lesser number, to be fixed by the committee, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of taking sworn testimony.

Sec. 5. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the various departments and agencies of the Government.

Sec. 6. The committee shall take special care to safeguard information affecting the national security.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me without losing the floor?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, notwithstanding rule XXVI, I ask unanimous consent that it now be in order to proceed to the consideration of the resolution just reported, on the investigation

of the CIA, for the limited purpose of determining any procedural problems relating thereto.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the resolution is not to "investigate" the CIA; it is to create a committee. The original McCarthy resolution was to investigate the CIA. This resolution was reported in place of that one.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the change be inserted in the request.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] is recognized.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to address a few remarks to the substance of, the necessity for, and the justification for the resolution which has just been stated. It is reported in place of the original resolution proposed in January by the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY].

Mr. President, the resolution which I bring before the Senate this morning would authorize the creation of a Select Committee on Intelligence Operations. It would consist of a total of nine members, three each from the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations. Its mandate would be "to keep itself fully and currently informed of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and other agencies of the Government insofar as the activities of such agencies relate to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence."

Our sponsorship of this resolution proceeds from the belief that the CIA plays a major role in the foreign policy decisionmaking process and that by its activities it is capable of exerting—and has exerted—a very substantial influence on our relations with other nations. The resolution which we bring before you is an assertion of the duty of the Foreign Relations Committee to be aware of all the developments and activities of our Government as they relate to foreign affairs.

When the CIA was created, the extent and nature of its present role could not be foreseen. From a modest beginning in an entirely different context of world politics, the operations of the CIA have grown today to exceed the Department of State in both number of personnel and budget. The CIA is an efficient organization and I compliment it because in many countries its representatives stay longer and in many ways are better prepared—certainly they are better financed and, in many cases, have more influence—than our ambassadors.

The CIA has certain unique characteristics which set it apart from other institutions involved in the foreign policy process of the Government. These characteristics give the Agency unusual advantages and influence and suggest the desirability of the Foreign Relations

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Committee being more aware of its activities.

As is natural with any organization—particularly one staffed by intelligent and dedicated individuals—the CIA becomes a factor in the decisionmaking process as an advocate for its own recommendations. Its ability to provide the facts on which decisions are made gives it a great advantage over the Department of State in this respect. The Agency is not under the same compulsion to subject its data or analyses to the bureaucratic clearance procedures which affect and often retard the efficiency and imagination of the Department of State. Insofar as the collection of basic intelligence data is concerned, this immunity is proper. The desirability of scrutiny becomes more obvious in the case of conclusions which the Agency draws from its own data—conclusions which may be virtually unchallengeable given the Agency's freedom in its choice and presentation of supporting evidence.

There are certain other advantages, seldom mentioned, which the CIA enjoys. It is not required to expend any significant portion of its energy in dealings with either the public at large or the Congress. It is not expected, for example, to play host and guide to visiting Members of Congress, and we do not refer to it a regular flow of constituent mail and problems. Furthermore, its officers are relatively free from the social and ceremonial requirements which so greatly distract their State Department counterparts.

These aspects of the CIA's nature and functions were well stated in the recent series of very thorough articles on the CIA appearing in the New York Times. One passage reads:

It is the CIA, unlike the Defense Department with its service rivalries, budget concerns and political involvements, and unlike the State Department with its international diplomatic responsibilities and its vulnerability to criticism, that is freest of all agencies to advocate its projects and press home its views; the CIA can promise action, if not success.

And both the Agency and those who must pass upon its plans are shielded by security from the outside oversight and review under which virtually all other officials operate, at home and abroad.¹

And in another of the articles, the Times pointed out:

Nevertheless, the CIA enjoys an inherent advantage in any conflict with the State or Defense Departments because of its undeniable expertise—especially in economics and science—and because it is free from such political entanglements as trying to build up a missile budget (as in the case of the Air Force) or of having to justify the recognition of a foreign leader (as in the case of State).²

In urging the creation of a select committee or a Committee on Intelligence Operations, I am not suggesting that the Congress can or should assume control of the CIA or the other intelligence gathering activities of our Government. This is clearly a function of executive responsibility directly related to the con-

duct of our foreign relations and the maintenance of national security.

It has been asserted that the CIA functions under the National Security Council and initiates no activity which has not been ordered by the NSC. This seeks to imply close, continuous supervision by an organized mechanism. In this connection, I noted with great interest a recent report that the National Security Council met on May 9 of this year, for the first time since July 1965. Furthermore, the formal NSC machinery in existence in earlier years has atrophied to the point of nonexistence.

It seems to me, therefore, that if there is a chance that the executive branch may not adequately assure the proper relation of the CIA to overall national interests—particularly those in the field of foreign policy—it is imperative that the Senate know enough about the CIA's activities to be able to offer its own suggestions in this respect. As my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY], has said, this is "not a question of passing judgment on any activities, but of proper procedures of the Government of the United States * * * it is a concern for the proper function of government, for the maintenance of proper relationships, and it is a desire to provide procedures by which the Senate, in this case through the Committee on Foreign Relations, can exercise its basic constitutional responsibility."—Senator EUGENE J. McCARTHY, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 16, 1966, page 10132.

The general public and congressional concern and uncertainty over the nature of the CIA's role in foreign affairs have found expression over the years in some different 200 resolutions which have come before the Senate on this subject. Of these, the proposal before us today is probably the most moderate. I believe that its adoption would contribute to the quieting of criticism, the allaying of public fears, and the restoring of confidence in the Agency.

The Senate has in the past created new mechanisms to meet new responsibilities. This precedent is at least as compelling in the situation before us today as that which vests legislative oversight in the committee which reports creating legislation. In instances where there are legitimate questions of jurisdiction and clearly intertwined responsibilities, I believe the Senate is far better served by the creation of a specially tailored select committee. As my respected colleague from Georgia has already acknowledged:

The Central Intelligence Agency occupies a very peculiar position in our scheme of things.³

I believe that it is time for the Senate to take formal action which recognizes the true and evolved nature of this "peculiar institution."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. While I recognize the limitations of institutional forms of control, I believe that the creation of the select committee called for in this resolution will strengthen our position in deal-

ing with executive branch officials who must ultimately exercise the control which is so essential if we are to be assured that our most honorable national principles and aspirations are not sacrificed to the immediate requirements of intelligence operations.

Another advantage which would result from the creation of a Select Committee on Intelligence Operations would be a more efficient coordination of the various intelligence activities of the Government. This aspect of the resolution has not received the attention which I believe it deserves. The overlapping and confusion of activities among the CIA, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency are a matter of common knowledge to those in the intelligence field. Last year's lamentable Camelot affair, resulting from an ill-advised project of the Department of Defense, was an excellent example of this situation.

The size of our overall intelligence effort is difficult to establish. However, an idea of its extent can be gained from the New York Times' estimate that its annual cost exceeds \$3 billion a year. According to the same source, this amount is more than six times that specifically allotted to the CIA. The Times estimated that the National Security Agency alone spends about \$1 billion of this total figure.

There is little doubt in my mind that a careful study of the entire intelligence community would result in a more efficient distribution of functions and, in turn, a reduction in its size and expense.

Finally, Mr. President, I believe that the failure of the Senate to take this small step in formal recognition of its duty to exercise a more comprehensive oversight of U.S. intelligence activities will evidence an abdication of our clear duty in an area where the activities of the executive branch can spell the difference between national honor and national discredit or, conceivably, between war and peace.

Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I believe that with the responsibility, for good or bad that this committee has, it is entitled to access to the kind of information which would be available from the CIA.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, at this moment I shall not digress to discuss the merits of the proposal as was done by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, because I wish to raise a procedural question, based, Mr. President, on rule XXV, of the Standing Rules of the Senate.

This has been a most extraordinary procedure since its very inception. For example, Mr. President, this resolution has not been introduced. It did not follow the ordinary course of a Senator's sending it to the desk for appropriate reference; if that had been done, the resolution would not have been referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. It would have been referred to the Committee on Armed Services. But we have it here before us now, under this very unusual legal, though extraordinary,

¹ The New York Times, Monday, Apr. 25, 1966.

² The New York Times, Thursday, Apr. 28, 1966.

³ Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 16, 1966, p. 10124.

procedure of having a committee meet and write within itself a self-serving resolution that affects other committees of the Senate, without the rules of the Senate governing reference of legislation having been applied.

I raise a point of order, Mr. President, that before this resolution goes to the calendar, it must be referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

Under paragraph (p) (1) (A) of section 1 of rule XXV matters pertaining to the payment of money out of the contingent fund of the Senate or creating a charge upon the same are referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? I missed the citation of the rule.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Paragraph (p) (1) (A) of section 1 of rule XXV prescribing the jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules and Administration.

The provision then continues:

except that any resolution relating to substantive matter within the jurisdiction of any other standing committee of the Senate shall be first referred to such committee.

Mr. President, this resolution, as originally introduced, provided, as the Senator has stated, for an investigation by the Committee on Foreign Relations, and for the appropriation of \$150,000 for the purpose of providing a staff and the facilities for conducting that investigation. Of course, such provisions immediately placed it within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules. So that part of the resolution was rewritten. It was redrafted as a Senate resolution creating a committee.

The distinguished Senator from Arkansas has referred to the fact that this is a select committee. It is only called a select committee in his statement to the Senate. It does not anywhere else appear so in the proceedings.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is not a select committee. Despite the fact that the Senator has called it that, it is a standing committee of the Senate that would be created. The resolution reads: "is hereby created a committee to be known as the Committee on Intelligence Operations." This is not a select committee in the ordinary sense of the word. It is a standing committee of the Senate of the United States that is proposed to be created, without reference to the Committee on Rules—which usually handles the creation of standing committees—or to the Committee on Armed Services—whose jurisdiction it invades in a number of instances.

I wish to point out further, Mr. President, that this is proposed to be done without hearing a single witness by the committee, in this self-serving, self-seeking resolution. It is presented here in this novel fashion to change the procedures of the Senate as they have existed since its creation, without a single witness appearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, so far as I am advised, to support the resolution.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We had the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on two occasions before the committee.

His testimony, which was restricted to the very superficial aspects of their activity, was the most persuasive witness with respect to the necessity of this resolution. I do not know of any further witness. In effect, this resolution is the outgrowth of the failure of the committee to receive what it believed to be significant intelligence from the Director of the CIA.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I intend to discuss that. But when the distinguished Senator from Arizona, who is the chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, wrote a letter to the members of that committee, pointing out that the Foreign Relations Committee was proposing to create a Subcommittee on Appropriations to deal with the appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency and all of the other agencies that are listed in the resolution, the Committee on Foreign Relations, to avoid that criticism, changed the resolution again, and struck out the asserted authority to deal with the appropriations and budgetary affairs of all these various investigative and intelligence agencies.

I use that illustration to show the unusual length to which the committee went in seeking to avoid the normal procedures of the Senate, in reporting the resolution without its having been introduced and without having been introduced at any hearings except that the distinguished chairman of the committee may have been dissatisfied with the refusal of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to divulge his methods and sources of obtaining information when he appeared before the committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not wish to impose on the Senator's time, but he has said that the Central Intelligence Agency occupies a very peculiar position. I do not think it is fair to say that the Foreign Relations Committee is trying to be self-seeking, self-serving, or trying to monopolize anything when it seeks participation. It is not trying to take this over.

All the resolution provides is that the Foreign Relations Committee be allowed to be a part. It does not seem to me to be a very extreme move. We are not trying to oust anybody from jurisdiction.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Why does not the Senator from Arkansas introduce a resolution from the floor for appropriate reference? Why does he bring it in from the committee in this form?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has said it is a very peculiar situation.

In consultation with the Parliamentarian about the point of order the Senator is about to make, the Parliamentarian said the Senate has no precedent for this kind of situation.

Actually, there is no precedent in the history of the Senate that I know of, for dealing with a body like the Central Intelligence Agency. This is a most peculiar agency, as the Senator said.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I decline to yield further.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Very well; but the Senator himself has said that.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not deny it at all. It is a peculiar agency.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The formal supervision which we are seeking has never been acted on. The Senate has never taken any specific action with regard to one of the largest agencies, one of the most expensive agencies in the entire Government. It is all done very informally. I think that is very unusual.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I challenge the Senator from Arkansas to bring forth a single other precedent since the Senate was first created in 1789 where a committee brought forward a resolution to create a new committee of which it would be a part that was not referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration or to another appropriate committee.

If this is not a case which is self-serving, I do not know what self-serving means.

This proposal is presented in an unusual and unprecedented fashion. I realize we are living in a new day; but I know of no other instance in which a committee has been created on which the members were selected by the chairman of a standing committee.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield for a question.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not true that the committee is reporting a resolution of which it does not have jurisdiction?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is true. They avoided jurisdiction by reporting it out and not introducing it for reference to the appropriate committee.

The proposal departs from the general practice of having the chair appoint the membership of a committee or having it done by a caucus of the two parties and ratified by the Senate. I have never heard of another instance like this and I do not believe that the Senator from Arkansas has.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what the Senator does now with the committee that functions in connection with the CIA, and this committee is following his precedent.

The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services designates members without the authority of the Senate, and the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations designates members—also without authority from the Senate. That is the way they presently operate. This is a peculiar situation of which there is no precedent.

The committee is asking the Senate, in its wisdom, to make up its mind whether it wants a committee such as this to be formal or not. That is all that it is asking. It is not asking to oust anybody.

This procedure is the procedure that is now being followed. The present informal committee, with no formal recognition, is selected by the respective chairmen.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am utterly surprised that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], who has graced this Senate for so many years, does not know the difference between a subcommittee and a committee. The Senator is talking about the subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services that now has responsibility for the

Central Intelligence Agency, but he is proposing to create a standing committee, not a subcommittee, and he proposes to do it by having the selections made by the members of three other standing committees of the Senate.

I know of no instance where that has been done. Of course, a subcommittee can be extinguished at the end of a session of the Senate—it is extinguished—unless it is renewed by the full committee. This resolution proposes what would be a permanent committee.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator from Georgia saying that if the resolution now before us and reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations in its present form had been sponsored from the floor, the resolution would have been referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It would have been referred either to the Committee on Rules and Administration or to the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, may we have a parliamentary ruling?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am confident it would have gone to one of those two committees. In my judgment, it would have been referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. PASTORE. May we ask for an official ruling?

At the same time, in connection with that, may I ask if the resolution which the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY] introduced was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That was because he asked to have the Committee on Foreign Relations conduct the investigation. He spelled that out in the resolution. He was not letting anyone else in on that.

Mr. President, there are some other unusual features about this.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. As to selection, I would be disposed to accept an amendment to have the members selected in the same way as any other committee.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am not taking an unusual privilege. It should be the same as any other committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is not essential to the resolution at all. If the Senator wishes to have members selected in the other fashion, it is perfectly all right with me, and I am sure that it is with the other members of the committee.

The simple proposition is whether or not the Senate, in its wisdom, wishes to take action on a matter of this kind or continue this vague situation.

There have been 200 resolutions showing discontent about it.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That would be revision 10 or 12 in the effort to get this resolution approved in some form. It has been rewritten, rewritten, and rewritten to avoid the jurisdiction of the appropriate committee, or committees, which should handle it.

Let me point out another novel thing. On every other standing committee of

the Senate, the chairman is selected by the Senate. What does this resolution provide? It provides that the chairman be elected by members of the standing committee.

It deviates from the practice that has obtained since the inception of the Senate. The Senate has elected the chairmen of committees. Here it is proposed that this is a special case, that owing to the peculiar nature of this agency, we should let the new committee take away jurisdiction from the Senate itself to elect the chairman. That is a most unusual provision. It is one that the Committee on Rules should examine after the Committee on Armed Services has examined into the functions of the subcommittee.

Now, Mr. President, as I say, this resolution has been rewritten and rewritten and rewritten time and again in an effort to avoid the ordinary parliamentary processes of this body. Under rule XXV, there is no doubt in my mind that this resolution should be considered by the Armed Services Committee. I do not know what the Parliamentarian would say, but I do know what the rules provide.

I am therefore glad to submit this parliamentary inquiry. If this resolution were introduced for appropriate reference, to what committee would this resolution be referred?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair wishes to ask the Senator from Georgia, is he referring now to the resolution as it was reported—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.

The VICE PRESIDENT (continuing). By the clerk from the Committee on Foreign Relations?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Under a cursory examination of this resolution, there is a feeling on the part of the Chair that in light of the—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I ask the Chair if he would examine into the resolution as to the agencies covered, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the others which are involved, and the jurisdiction that is now fixed, before he makes a ruling.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is posing a hypothetical case. I want to make that clear at this point, because the resolution before the Senate comes from the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is correct.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator poses the question, if this resolution had been introduced from the floor of the Senate, and asked for appropriate referral, where would it have gone to? On a cursory examination, it appears to deal with matters of national security, which is the subject matter covered by the Committee on Armed Services and that is the committee to which the resolution would be referred.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield at that point?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would not wish to yield right now, although I am glad to—

The VICE PRESIDENT. This ruling does not relate to the proposition that is presently before the Senate.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I understand that. I am not complaining. I am not saying this is an illegal procedure. I say it is an extraordinary procedure that is resorted to only for special purposes by committees when they write bills within the committee and do not introduce them from the floor. That is the objection I am making. I say, for that reason, that a point of order should be sustained by the Chair, and this resolution should not go to the calendar but should be referred to the Committee on Armed Services, so that we would at least have an opportunity to have some kind of hearing from the agencies affected as to what effect they think this resolution might have upon them and their operations.

Mr. President, I want to clear up a misconception which has arisen here, particularly in the distinguished newspaper published in New York which the Senator quoted with authority about a dozen times in the course of his remarks, as to what legislative oversight means.

That particular paper seems to have the idea that legislative oversight means that a legislative committee which is overlooking has some control over the administration of that agency.

That is not true. Nothing could be further from the facts. All that we can do by overlooking is to keep ourselves informed as to what an agency is doing, with the exception of the Committee on Appropriations. I want to make that exception. They have the power of the purse. If they feel disposed, they can reduce the appropriation. But the other standing committees, when they are exercising legislative oversight, cannot control the operations of the agency.

I would say, Mr. President, that the most illuminating example of that of which I have any knowledge is the fact that the Committee on Foreign Relations has legislative oversight over the Department of State.

Anyone who has read the newspapers for the last 8 months knows just how far the Foreign Relations Committee has missed in controlling or directing the activities of the Department of State. That shows just how much this legislative oversight function gives a committee control over an agency. All that it does is to enable committees to keep themselves informed about what an agency is doing and undertake to measure up to our legislative responsibilities in that light.

The State Department itself has an intelligence operation apart from the CIA. Each of the military departments has intelligence activities. The CIA is somewhat of a coordinating institution for other intelligence gatherers.

Mr. President, I want to say also that the Foreign Relations Committee has available to it practically all the information which is available to the subcommittee on the CIA of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, with one or two minor exceptions.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee can get any intelligence estimate that has been arrived at in this Govern-

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ment on a particular situation in any country that bears upon our international relations.

One of the incidents that gave rise to this matter was when the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency declined to testify as to his sources of information and his methods of acquiring information. That matter is so sensitive, Mr. President, that only in the most extraordinary circumstances has the Armed Services Subcommittee, as careful as it has been, gone into the sources of information and the methods which the CIA has used in gathering information.

Why, Mr. President, if there were evidence of the slightest disclosure of the sources of information to the CIA from any source, if the report got out tomorrow—and I use this purely as a hypothetical illustration—that the Secretary of the Soviet Legation in Tasmania was revealing information to the CIA, our intelligence sources throughout the world would dry up. It would frighten them all to death. We could not get one iota of information. The act creating the CIA particularly charged that the Director of that agency protect and maintain the highest classification of secrecy on the methods and sources of his information. That is properly so. If he does not do this, the CIA is not worth a plugged nickel so far as getting any clandestine information is concerned, because the slightest indication that a source of information is likely to be revealed would discourage the flow of information immediately and instantly.

Mr. President, at times an effort is made by committees to exercise an influence over executive agencies by the process of publicity. They publicize certain things. They leak information to the press in an effort to build up public sentiment, to control the editorial policy of great newspapers, thereby to influence national policy. I am not going to debate the merits of such tactics in ordinary circumstances, but I am going to say that they do not work where the CIA is concerned. The first time such methods were tried, we will have destroyed the usefulness of the CIA and we might as well abolish it.

The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee can call the Director of the CIA before his committee any time he wishes and he can get from him any information available to the Committee on Armed Services except as to sources and methods, and as to budgetary matters and how much money is spent for certain things.

Let me emphasize that when I refer to all these cloak and dagger operations, that they constitute a very small part of the total operations. They are vital. We must have them. Much of the rest might be of little value without those operations. However, the relative cost of the secret operations is not large.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield for a question.

Mr. MORSE. I have listened with great interest to the remarks of the Senator. When he says that the Foreign Relations Committee can get what-

ever information it seeks on intelligence matters from the CIA except information with respect to sources and methods used in connection with the collection of that information and the expenditure of money, is the Armed Services Committee able to get that information?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We can get information as to sources and methods, but I want to be very frank with the Senator. I do not want the information except in the very rarest of cases. And the other members of the committee do not want that information except in unusual circumstances.

I want to say further that I do not think it is wise for the legislative branch of the Government to know all the sources from which the CIA gets its information. We should be interested in the validity of it and the importance to be attached to it. All of that is weighed in what they call the intelligence community, which consists of representatives of several agencies and departments of the executive branch.

Mr. MORSE. Will the Senator yield for one additional question to seek information?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Is it the argument of the Senator from Georgia that if this select committee—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is not a select committee. It is a standing committee.

Mr. MORSE. Is it the argument of the Senator from Georgia that if the Subcommittee of the Armed Services, in connection with receiving the CIA report, had added to it three members of the Foreign Relations Committee, which would be bound by the procedures of the committee in regard to the CIA, that that would increase the danger that information as to the sources and the methods of collection and financing would be made public?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Without the least intention of giving offense to the Senator or to his committee, I want to say that every time we add one person from any committee to the subcommittee, we increase the chances that there will be some leak.

Mr. MORSE. But there would be no danger if it were limited to Members of the U.S. Senate who are members of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No. There is also a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, and by a strange coincidence of parliamentary life, the membership of the two committees happen to contain some duplications. The members of the Appropriations Committee, of course, have the last word because they can cut off the means of existence of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other agency.

Mr. MORSE. Does it not follow that the Senator is arguing, when he makes the statement in regard to the protection of the source and the method of collecting and financing of the material of the CIA, that there is no question about its protection if the committee is limited to its present members in the availability to such material, but that if

three members of the Foreign Relations Committee are added who will be bound by the same rules as those by which the Armed Services Committee is bound, we would then run into some danger of disclosing matters of secrecy?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I have been here for some time. I want to say that there is a great deal of difference in the application that some Senators give to their responsibilities for maintaining matters that they get in executive session and the application that some other Senators give to such responsibilities.

Sometimes I have seen classified matters, given in executive session, printed in the newspapers before the committee adjourned.

Any Senator who has been here for any time knows that there is a difference between the approach of some Senators to matters of classification and the approach of other Senators to such matters.

I say that without any invidious comparison. It is true on the Armed Services Committee. It is true on every other committee, and it is true in the Senate as a whole.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield first to the Senator from North Carolina. I will have to stop yielding. I want to complete this argument.

Mr. ERVIN. My question is very simple. This does not reflect on any member of any committee. However, is it not a self-evident fact that every time an additional person is given secret information there is danger of it being disclosed? The more people who know a secret, the more apt it is to be disclosed, no matter who those people are?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As I say, if we increase the membership of the committee by one, we increase the danger of material being disclosed. I do not care who it is. It is a fact of life.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, the ranking minority member on both committees.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I appreciate the statement of the Senator. If we were to add Foreign Relations Committee members to the subcommittee of the Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services, why should we not add members of the Committee on Government Operations and members of other committees?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think there is some merit in the statement of the Senator. However, I will not debate all the merits of it today.

I am taking the position that the Senate should not agree to this unusual parliamentary procedure under which a committee sits in its own committee room and writes a resolution concerning something that belongs in the jurisdiction of some other committee. They then report it here and seek to deny jurisdiction

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ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow; and, furthermore, I ask unanimous consent that after a 15-minute morning hour the unfinished business, the agriculture appropriation bill, be laid before the Senate and debate begun.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate has heard the question. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. NELSON (when his name was called). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "yea." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "nay." I withhold my vote.

The rollcall was concluded.

Mr. MANSFIELD (after having voted in the negative). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the distinguished Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS]. If he were present and voting he would vote "yea." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "nay." Therefore, I withhold my vote.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], and the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], and the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] would each vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] is absent because of illness, and if present and voting, would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 61, nays 28, as follows:

[No. 137 Leg.]

YEAS—61

Allott	Hayden	Neuberger
Bartlett	Hickenlooper	Pastore
Bayh	Hill	Pearson
Bennett	Holland	Prouty
Bible	Hruska	Randolph
Brewster	Inouye	Ribicoff
Byrd, Va.	Jackson	Robertson
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Russell, S.C.
Cannon	Jordan, Idaho	Russell, Ga.
Carlson	Kuchel	Saltonstall
Cooper	Lausche	Simpson
Cotton	Long, Mo.	Smith
Curtis	Long, La.	Stennis
Dirksen	Magnuson	Symington
Dominick	McClellan	Talmadge
Douglas	McIntyre	Thurmond
Eastland	Miller	Tower
Ellender	Montoya	Tydings
Ervin	Morton	Young, N. Dak.
Fannin	Mundt	
Harris	Murphy	

NAYS—28

Alken	Hartke	Moss
Boggs	Javits	Muskie
Burdick	Kennedy, Mass.	Pell
Case	Kennedy, N.Y.	Proxmire
Church	McCarthy	Williams, N.J.
Fong	McGovern	Williams, Del.
Fulbright	Metcalf	Yarborough
Gore	Mondale	Young, Ohio
Griffin	Mohroney	
Hart	Morse	

NOT VOTING—11

Anderson	Gruening	Scott
Bass	Mansfield	Smathers
Clark	McGee	Sparkman
Dodd	Nelson	

So the point of order of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] was sustained.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to consider executive business, for the purpose of considering Executive F—89th Congress, 2d session—a protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

PROTOCOL FOR THE FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT AGREEMENT, 1962

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay before the Senate Executive F, 89th Congress, 2d session.

There being no objection, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider Executive F, 89th Congress, 2d session, the protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962, which was read the second time.

EXECUTIVE F—PROTOCOL FOR THE FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT AGREEMENT, 1962

The Governments signatory to this Protocol,

Considering that the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 which was extended by Protocol in 1965, expires on 31 July 1966, and Desiring to extend the Agreement, in accordance with the recommendations of the International Wheat Council under paragraph (2) of Article 36 of the Agreement, for a further period,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962

The International Wheat Agreement, 1962 as extended by the 1965 Protocol (hereinafter called "the Agreement") shall continue in force between the parties to this Protocol until 31 July 1967.

ARTICLE 2

Signature, acceptance, approval and accession

(1) This Protocol shall be open for signature in Washington from 4 April 1966 until and including 29 April 1966 by the Government parties to the Agreement, or which are provisionally regarded as parties to the Agreement, on 4 April 1966.

(2) This Protocol shall be subject to acceptance or approval by the signatory Governments in accordance with their constitu-

tional procedures. Instruments of acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America not later than 15 July 1966.

(3) This Protocol shall be open for accession:

(a) until 15 July 1966 by the Government of any country listed in Annex B or C to the Agreement as of that date in accordance with the conditions specified in the Agreement or prescribed by the Council before its accession to the Agreement, or

(b) as provided in paragraph (4) of Article 35 of the Agreement.

(4) Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.

(5) Any Government which has not accepted, approved or acceded to this Protocol by 15 July 1966 in accordance with paragraph (2) or (3)(a) of this Article may be granted by the Council an extension of time for depositing its instrument of acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 3

Entry into force

(1) This Protocol shall enter into force among those Governments which have deposited instruments of acceptance, approval or accession in accordance with Article 2 of this Protocol by 15 July 1966 as follows:

(a) on 16 July 1966, with respect to Part I and Parts III to VII of the Agreement, and

(b) on 1 August 1966, with respect to Part II of the Agreement. Provided, that such Governments and the Governments which have deposited notification in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article by 15 July 1966 are Governments which held not less than two-thirds of the votes of exporting countries and not less than two-thirds of the votes of importing countries under the Agreement on that date, or would have held such votes if they had been parties to the Agreement on that date.

(2) This Protocol shall enter into force for any Government which deposits an instrument of acceptance, approval or accession after 15 July 1966 on the date of such deposit except that the Protocol shall not enter into force with respect to Part II of the Agreement earlier than 1 August 1966.

(3) For the purposes of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article, any signatory Government or any Government entitled to accede in accordance with paragraph (3)(a) of Article 2 of this Protocol or any Government whose application for accession has been approved by the Council on conditions established under paragraph (3)(b) of Article 2 of this Protocol may deposit a notification with the Government of the United States of America not later than 15 July 1966 containing an undertaking to seek acceptance, approval or accession to this Protocol as rapidly as possible in accordance with its constitutional procedures. It is understood that a Government which gives such a notification will provisionally apply the Protocol and be provisionally regarded as a party thereto for a period to be determined by the Council.

(4) If by 15 July 1966 the conditions laid down in the preceding paragraphs of this Article for entry into force of this Protocol are not fulfilled, the Governments of those countries which by that date have accepted, approved or acceded in accordance with Article 2 of this Protocol may decide by mutual consent that it shall enter into force among them or they may take whatever other action they consider the situation requires.

ARTICLE 4

Final provisions

(1) For the purposes of the operation of the Agreement and this Protocol, any reference to countries the respective Governments

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to the other committee as a result of their procedure.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, a point of order.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the Senator from Georgia yield for a point of order?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I would like it to be quiet so that we can all hear this colloquy.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I am doing my best to bring the matter to a conclusion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I did not interrupt him in the course of his remarks, but it is all right.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The remark of the Senator from Massachusetts seems to leave the impression that we should prevent action on the part of the Foreign Relations Committee because it has no concern with the subject matter.

I tried to make it clear that the Committee on Foreign Relations is charged by the Senate and by the rules with responsibility on foreign relations and is in a very peculiar relationship to this activity.

The activity that we are interested in is the foreign relations activity. Our interest has nothing to do with the domestic activities. If the CIA should seek to intervene in a domestic matter, we would not be interested. We have never asked for that information. If they were participating in an election on domestic matters, that would be something beyond our interest.

It is well known that this country is in great difficulty and is involved in a most dreadful and tragic war in which activity this country is the least unified of any country that I know of. It involves a grave responsibility of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

We think we ought to know what part the CIA plays in situations such as we are involved in in Vietnam, and such as we have been involved in in Guatemala, in Iran, and in other parts of the world. When they refute reports by reputable organizations and reports written by well-established journalists, we cannot have the information that would prove or disprove the refutation. But, when he insinuates that the Foreign Relations Committee has no more interest in this than does any other committee, he is absolutely wrong.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not think he said any other committee; he said the Government Operations Committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have a more direct responsibility for foreign relations than does the Armed Services Committee, to be frank about it. I do not know why the Senator monopolizes the CIA.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am not trying to muscle in on the Senator's committee. I am trying to keep the

Senator from muscling in on my committee. That is what I am doing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is nothing in the legislation that gives the Armed Services Committee exclusive jurisdiction on this subject. This is a power that his committee has assumed simply because the National Security Act came out of that committee.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I do not yield further, and I do not accept that statement. There is nothing here that would justify the statement that the Central Intelligence Agency will not give the Foreign Relations Committee any information.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. "Significant," I said.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not believe that is correct. It would be far from the purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency. In my opinion, the President of the United States was correct in not authorizing the CIA to give details on the methods and sources of obtaining information.

Mr. President, the sponsors of this resolution emphasize that the CIA affects foreign policy. But it seems to me that affecting the subject is insufficient, under our practice, to confer legislative jurisdiction. If every committee that had some small degree of interest in a subject insisted upon the creation of special committees like this to deal with it we would have such a proliferation of committees around here that the Members of the Senate could not possibly name them all. They could not bear their names in mind. If we are going to create a special committee every time there is apparently any overlapping or conflict of jurisdiction, we would have such proliferation that it would destroy the present and existing committee system of the Senate of the United States.

I submit to the Senate, Mr. President, that this point of order is valid, and that the Committee on Armed Services, to which this resolution would ordinarily be referred if normal procedures were followed, should have an opportunity to consider this resolution before it goes to the Senate calendar.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the Senator from Georgia please restate his point of order?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. My point of order is that under rule XXV, the provision of which I have read, the subsection of the rule dealing with the Committee on Rules and Administration, this resolution relates to a substantive matter within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services, and therefore should be first referred to such committee, before it goes to the calendar. That is the point of order I made.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? I wish to ask a question.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Does not the President of the United States have sole jurisdiction over the operations of the CIA and as to what information it can disclose?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. He has

complete control of it, through the National Security Council.

The Senator from Arkansas referred to the fact that there had been only one full meeting of the National Security Council for many months, but there are constant meetings of subcommittees of the National Security Council.

I do not believe the President has failed so signally in his duty that he has bypassed and neglected and disowned as important an agency of the Government as the National Security Council.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate go into closed session.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I second the motion. (At 12 o'clock and 25 minutes p.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed.)

At the conclusion of the closed door session, the doors were reopened at 4 o'clock and 5 minutes p.m., and the Senate was called to order by the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE].

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, would the Chair state the question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the point of order of the Senator from Georgia, that under rule XXV the original resolution reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations consists of subject matter predominately under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services and therefore is improperly before the Senate and must be referred to that committee before it can properly be placed on the Senate Calendar.

The yeas and nays have been ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may I just bring this to the attention of the Senate. Immediately following this vote, there will be a vote on the International Wheat Agreement Treaty, which was reported unanimously by the Committee on Foreign Relations, and which I understand is up against a time limitation tomorrow.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry. The vote "yea" sustains the point of order; the vote "nay" is to overrule the point of order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. When is it the intention of the majority leader that the Senate again take up the agricultural appropriation bill?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Tomorrow.

Mr. HOLLAND. At what hour?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Twelve o'clock tomorrow, Mr. President.

WASHINGTON
DAILY NEWS

NOV 14 1956

Backs President's Moves, Tho

Mansfield Says CIA Kept Ike Dark on Hungary

By JIM G. LUCAS Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Sen. Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.) said today there was "some question" whether the Central Intelligence Agency had kept President Eisenhower fully informed about developments in Hungary.

Sen. Mansfield is slated to become Democratic whip in the next Congress. This would make him the No. 2 man on that side of the Senate. He also is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, which was briefed by key administration officials earlier this week.

TOUGH ON IKE

"The President should have known about conditions in Hungary in advance," he said. "Instead, we all were caught by surprise and Mr. Eisenhower has had to play it by ear."

However, the Montana Democrat endorsed most of the President's actions since the revolt broke out.

"He is right in depending upon the United Nations," the senator said. "The UN as a matter of fact, has done remarkably well. Out of these trials, it may finally achieve

the prestige and standing it should have.

"From its inception, the United Nations has had burdens thrust upon it that the founders didn't contemplate. It was supposed to have taken over after the peace had been secured, and everybody knows there has been no peace."

Sen. Mansfield, on the subject of recent events in Hungary, said:

"Russia has lost in the eyes of the world, but the Soviets have kept their Iron Curtain. Ever since the death of Stalin, there has been a struggle for power inside the Soviet Union. It now looks as if Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev are being pushed aside by the old Stalinists like Molotov."

In Poland, he said, Wladyslaw Gomulka, Communist Party boss, has "gained a little breathing time."